

# Institutions, Human Capital and Development\*

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## Abstract

In this paper we revisit the relationship between institutions, human capital and development. We argue that empirical models that treat institutions and human capital as exogenous are misspecified both because of the usual omitted variable bias problems and because of differential measurement error in these variables, and that this misspecification is at the root of the very large returns of human capital, about 4 to 5 times greater than that implied by micro (Mincerian) estimates, found in some of the previous literature. Using cross-country and cross-regional regressions, we show that when we focus on historically-determined differences in human capital and control for the effect of institutions, the impact of institutions on long-run development is robust, while the estimates of the effect of human capital are much diminished and become consistent with micro estimates. Using historical and cross-country regression evidence, we also show that there is no support for the view that differences in the human capital endowments of early European colonists have been a major factor in the subsequent institutional development of these polities.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

“the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation, etc.) are not causes of growth; they *are* growth” (italics in original) - As North and Thomas (1973, p. 2)

In laying out their explanation for the “Rise of the Western World” in 1973, North and Thomas made a distinction between what they argued were the ‘proximate’ and the ‘fundamental’ determinants of economic growth. In the quote above they list some of the proximate factors, innovation, education, capital accumulation—roughly corresponding to the factors of production embodied in the aggregate production function. The thrust of their argument was that while it is clear that rich countries have greater levels of total factor productivity (TFP), more educated workers (human capital) and more machines, tools and factories (physical capital), to say this is not an explanation of the sources of differences in prosperity. Rather, it is just to re-describe what it means to be prosperous. The interesting intellectual question, from their point of view, was to ask why it is that some countries are so much more innovative than others, why they invest much more resources into the educational system, and why people save and invest to accumulate physical capital.

North and Thomas’s theoretical approach can be captured in a simple diagram

fundamental determinants  $\implies$  proximate determinants  $\implies$  economic development,

More specifically, North and Thomas argued for the following causal chain

$$\text{institutions} \implies \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{TFP} \\ \text{human capital} \\ \text{physical capital} \end{array} \right\} \implies \text{economic development}$$

which can also be applied when the key fundamental determinant is not institutions but other factors such as culture or geography.

Institutions are by no means absent in standard economic theory, but are often left implicit. For example, Arrow and Debreu’s approach to general equilibrium presumes a set of very specific institutions that specify the initial ownership of assets in society, enforce private property rights over factors of production and shares that individuals hold in firms in the economy, uphold contract and prevent monopolization of markets. What was missing in economic analyses until recently was systematic evidence on whether and how institutions influence economic development, as well as theoretical insights on why institutions differ across countries and how they evolve.

This empirical challenge is difficult because institutions are endogenous and develop in tandem with other potential determinants of long-run economic performance, but we do not precisely know how they differ and evolve across countries. So any attempt to ascertain the importance of institutions for economic development by simply looking at their correlation with various measures of economic development, or equivalently throwing them in on the right-hand side of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, is unlikely to provide convincing evidence.

The recent literature has therefore focused on various strategies to isolate differences in institutions across countries that are plausibly exogenous to other determinants of long-run economic performance. AJR (2001), following in the footsteps of initial research by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999), adopted just such an approach. They exploited an historically-determined, plausibly-exogenous source of variation in a broad measure of economic institutions.

In particular, AJR argued that there were various types of colonization policies used by Europeans in the modern world which created different sets of institutions. At one extreme, European powers set up “extractive institutions” to transfer resources from the colony to themselves, and this led to the creation of economic institutions supporting such extraction, particularly forms of labor coercion like slavery, monopolies, legal discrimination and rules which made the property rights of the indigenous masses insecure. At the other extreme, Europeans settled and tried to replicate, or in fact improve over, European institutions. This led to “inclusive institutions” which were much better for economic growth. The colonization strategy adopted by the Europeans was naturally influenced by the feasibility of settlements. Specifically, in places where the mortality rate from disease for Europeans was relatively high, the odds were against the creation of settler colonies with inclusive institutions, and the formation of extractive institutions was more likely. Finally, these colonial institutions, once set up, have tended to persist. Based on this reasoning, AJR suggested that the potential mortality rates expected by early European settlers in the colonies could be an instrument for current institutions in these countries.

The basic idea of their theory can be summarized as:

Potential mortality of European settlers  $\Rightarrow$  settlements  $\Rightarrow$  past institutions  $\Rightarrow$  current institutions.

As a practical matter, AJR (2001) estimated a simple two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with log GDP per capita today (in their case, in 1995) as the dependent variable, and a measure of economic institutions, proxied by protection against the risk of expropriation, as the key explanatory variable. This variable was instrumented with the logarithm of potential settler mortality. The use the log transform was motivated by the argument that the relation-

ship between potential mortality of settlers and settlements is likely to be concave (e.g., few would attempt settlements beyond a certain level of mortality), and the fact that some of the very high mortality estimates were due to epidemics, unusual idiosyncratic conditions, or small sample variation, and thus potentially unrepresentative of mortality rates that would ordinarily have been expected by settlers. AJR (2012) went one step further and used an alternative formulation of the instrument capping potential settler mortality estimates at 250 per 1000.<sup>1</sup>

With the original formulation of the settler mortality instrument or its capped version, the results are similar and show a large effect of institutions on long-run development. The results appear robust to controlling for various measures of geography that could be correlated with economic development, continent dummies, whether a country was colonized by the British, French or other European powers, and various measures of current health. They are also robust, even if somewhat less precise, when the neo-Europes (the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) are dropped.<sup>2</sup> Quantitatively, the results are first-order, for example, accounting for as much as 75% of the gaps between high and low institutions countries.<sup>3</sup>

In their empirical strategy, AJR followed the paradigmatic structure outlined by North and Thomas. They treated physical capital, human capital and TFP as proximate causes, determined by, and acting as channels of influence for, institutions, and thus did not control for these separately. According to this approach, it would be both incorrect and hard to interpret to control for, say, TFP differences across countries in trying to explain differences in income per capita with institutions. If the bulk of the effect of institutions on income per capita worked through TFP differences, then such a regression would lead to a zero coefficient on institutions, but this would of course not mean that institutions are not a fundamental determinant of income

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<sup>1</sup>AJR follow Curtin (1989, 1998) and the 19th century literature by reporting mortality per 1000 mean strength (also referred to as “with replacement”), meaning that the mortality rate refers to the number of soldiers who would have died in a year if a force of 1000 had been maintained in place for the entire year.

The 250 per 1000 estimate was suggested by A.M. Tulloch, the leading expert on mortality of soldiers in the 19th century, as the maximum mortality in the most unhealthy part of the world for Europeans (see Curtin, 1990, p.67, Tulloch, 1840, p.7).

Recall that if a variable is a valid instrument, meaning that it is orthogonal to the error term in the second stage, then any monotone transformation thereof is also orthogonal to the same error term and thus a valid instrument too.

<sup>2</sup>The neo-Europes are the best-case illustration of AJR’s (2001) hypothesis. Dropping them is useful to see whether a similar pattern applies even once these four exemplars are excluded.

<sup>3</sup>AJR (2002) takes a different but complementary approach and shows how the density of indigenous population before Europeans arrived affected the returns from setting up extractive institutions for Europeans (since labor was a key resource enabling Europeans to run extractive colonies). AJR (2002) show that the effect of population density circa 1500 accounts for why there has been a reversal of fortunes within the former colonies, whereby the areas that were previously more prosperous (and thus more densely populated) ended up relatively poorer today.

Engerman and Sokoloff’s famous work (e.g., 1997, 2011) is also related. They emphasize how the diverging development paths of the Americas over the past 500 years was related to initial conditions which led to different institutions in different parts of the Americas.

per capita. Equally worryingly, even if TFP were not a major channel through which differences in institutions impact prosperity, differential measurement error in TFP and institutions would lead to estimates indicating a major role for TFP and no or little role for institutions. To see why, note that TFP is naturally correlated with institutions (which, according to AJR, are the fundamental cause working in part through TFP). But if TFP were subject to less measurement error than institutions, the effect of institutions would be attenuated and load on to the TFP variable. In summary, under the paradigmatic approach of North and Thomas, controlling for the proximate determinants in trying to estimate the effects of fundamental causes would be what Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 64-68) have referred to as “bad control”.

One can of course challenge this entire conceptual framework. For example, the modernization hypothesis outlined by Lipset (1959) suggests that economic growth and the processes that go along with—such as expanding education, urbanization or the development of a middle class—create institutional change. Lipset, in particular, emphasized the role of these factors in laying the foundations for democracy. According to this view, institutions are likely to be a sideshow or at the very least largely shaped by, or adapted to, the differences in education or urbanization in society. Lipset did not himself propose a theory of why a country did or did not experience modernization, but his emphasis finds echoes in much recent research. Easterlin (1981), for instance, put differential paths of human capital development at the heart of the “Great Divergence” in economic development which has taken place in the modern world. He conceptualized the divergence in human capital across countries as idiosyncratic, related for instance to religious conversion and protestantism’s emphasis on individuals’ ability to read the bible.

A more recent version of this approach was articulated by Glaeser, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) who criticized the AJR (2001) for putting the institutional cart before the human capital horse. They suggested that the main thing that Europeans brought to their colonies was human capital, and they did so differentially across them. In places where they brought more human capital, the economy flourished and society came to be organized differently (and this may or may not have contributed to the flourishing of the economy). Places where they brought no or less human capital faltered. According to this perspective, AJR’s (2001) empirical strategy was capturing the significant impact of human capital on long-run development, particularly because it is presumed that Europeans brought more human capital to settler colonies such as the United States. Glaeser et al. (2004) provided several types of evidence to bolster their case, which we discuss in the next section.

## 1.2 This Paper

In this paper, we critically assess the roles of human capital and institutions in long-run economic development. The paper has three main contributions. First, in Section 3 we provide a brief historical survey of what is known about the human capital that Europeans brought to their colonies in the Americas. The main point of this survey is to show that, contrary to what Glaeser et al. (2004) presume, Europeans appear to have brought more human capital per person to their extractive colonies than their settler colonies (using AJR’s terminology) with inclusive institutions. If the United States is more educated today than Peru or Mexico, this is not because original colonizers there had higher human capital. Rather, it is because the United States established institutions that supported mass schooling while Peru and Mexico did not.

Our second main set of results, presented in Section 5, is based on a new cross-country investigation of the effects of institutions and human capital on GDP per capita today. Here, in addition to exploiting the same sources of variation in institutions as in AJR (2001, 2002, 2012), we follow Gallego and Woodbury (2009, 2010) and Woodbury (2011) in using variation in protestant missionary activity as a determinant of long-run differences in human capital in the former colonies. The argument here is that, conditional on the continent, the identity of the colonizer and the quality of institutions, much of the variation in protestant missionary activity was determined by idiosyncratic factors and need not be correlated with the potential for future economic development.<sup>4</sup> Because protestant missionaries played an important role in setting up schools, partly motivated by their desire to encourage reading of the Scriptures, this may have had a durable impact on schooling (Woodberry, 2004, 2012, Becker and Woessman, 2009).<sup>5</sup>

We find that when human capital, proxied by average years of schooling, is treated as exogenous by itself or instrumented by protestant missionary activity early in the 20th century, it has returns in the range of 25-35% (in terms of the contribution of one more year of average schooling to GDP per capita today). These numbers are very similar to those implied by the regressions reported in Glaeser et al. (2004).<sup>6</sup> They can be directly compared to the contribution of one more year of individual schooling on individual earnings, which are typically estimated

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<sup>4</sup>Consistent with this, we show in Table 3 that protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century is uncorrelated with prior levels of schooling.

<sup>5</sup>The conditioning here is important. Protestant missionaries certainly went to some places ahead of others. First, they went to places with a lot of native people because their main objective was conversions. Second, they may have had an easier time in penetrating into the interior of countries which already had better institutions (indeed, protestant missionary activity is correlated with our historical instruments for institutions). Third, missionary activity differed systematically between continents and between British, French and other colonies.

<sup>6</sup>Glaeser et al. (2004)—somewhat unusually given the well-established micro and macro literatures on this topic (e.g., Card, 1999, Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Acemoglu, 2009)—use the logarithm of average years of schooling on the right-hand side, so the exact magnitude of the returns to human capital, especially in comparison to micro estimates, cannot be easily seen from their regressions.

to be in the range of 6-10% (see Card, 1999, for a survey). But in theory and reality, these two numbers should be more tightly linked.<sup>7</sup> With an elastic supply of capital, no externalities and no omitted variable biases, the two numbers should be the same (see Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 3, Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, and Caselli, 2005). If the supply of capital is inelastic, the aggregate estimate should be even smaller. One way in which the cross-country estimate could be larger is if there are very large human capital externalities. But, existing evidence does not support human capital externalities of any significant magnitude, certainly not as large as the own effects (e.g., Rauch, 2003, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Duflo, 2004, Caselli, 2005, Ciccone and Peri, 2006, but see also Moretti, 2004). So there is a *prima facie* case for a severe omitted variable bias in these regressions that include human capital. Either human capital is proxying for something else or it is capturing some of the effects of institutions.

Our results in Section 5 support the second interpretation. Once we control for the historical determinants of institutions and human capital, or simultaneously treat both variables as endogenous, the estimates of the effect of human capital on long-run development decline significantly and are often in the range of 6-10%, consistent with the micro (Mincerian) evidence—though they are not always significantly different from zero. In contrast, the impact of institutions on long-run development remains qualitatively and quantitatively robust to whether human capital is included in the regression (and treated endogenously) or historical determinants of education are directly controlled for. This evidence provides support for the view that institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run development, working not only through physical capital and TFP but also through human capital.

For our third main set of results, we turn to cross-regional data (defined mostly at the level of the first-level administrative division, such as US states, Colombian departments and Argentine provinces). Exploiting variation in protestant missionary activity across 670 regions across former European colonies, we investigate the role of human capital in long-run regional development. As documented in Acemoglu and Dell (2010) for Latin America and in Gennaioli et al. (2013) more broadly, there is huge regional inequality within countries and this is correlated with the average educational attainment of the inhabitants of the regions. Gennaioli et al. (2013)

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<sup>7</sup>Gennaioli, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2013) provide a model of the spatial distribution of income per capita and human capital with externalities, and suggest that the larger impact of schooling on incomes at the macro than the individual level is due to the contribution of entrepreneurial inputs (related to average levels of schooling in a region/country). Though this is a theoretical possibility, it is not straightforward to reconcile with existing evidence. For example, Rauch (1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Duflo (2004) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) exploit variation in average schooling in a local labor market, and this local variation should also capture differences in the average human capital of entrepreneurs. The limited externalities that these papers estimate suggest that the external effects of human capital working through entrepreneurial inputs is also likely to be limited.

interpret this OLS correlation as the causal effect of education on regional prosperity. We show that at the regional level too (once we control for country fixed effects, thus focusing purely on within-country variation), there is a strong correlation between human capital and GDP per capita today, and the coefficient is comparable in size to the returns, in the range of 25-35%, one sees in the cross-country data. However, when differences in average years of schooling are treated as endogenous and instrumented with protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century the coefficient on human capital once again declines significantly and is often far from being statistically different from zero and from the traditional Mincerian (micro) estimates in the 6-10% range.

We interpret our cross-country and cross-regional results not as evidence that human capital is unimportant for long-run economic development. Rather, once the fundamental cause of cross-country economic development, institutional differences, is controlled for directly or through its historical proxies, the effects of human capital is cut down to the plausible range implied by micro evidence. And since these institutional differences are also at the root of the differences in human capital, institutions and human capital are positively correlated, and estimates of the latter's effect becomes somewhat imprecise. But the bottom line appears to be clear: the evidence is quite robust that institutional differences, once instrumented by their historical determinants as in AJR (2001, 2002, 2012), are the major cause of current differences in prosperity, and it is also fairly consistent with North and Thomas's overall distinction between fundamental and proximate determinants of long-run economic development.

### **1.3 Outline**

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses Glaeser et al.'s (2004) and Gennaioli et al.'s (2013) previous attempts to distinguish between human capital and institutions in long-run economic development. Section 3 surveys the historical evidence on the human capital levels of early European colonists in the Americas, documenting that they tended to be more educated in the very extractive Spanish colonies of Latin America and less so in the settler colony which became the United States. Section 4 introduces the cross-country and cross-regional data we utilize in the rest of the paper. Section 5 provides our main cross-country results, showing that once we properly control for institutions or their historical determinants, the effect of human capital is estimated to be in a range consistent with micro evidence, and much smaller than what is sometimes presumed or assumed, while controlling for human capital has little qualitative or quantitative impact on the estimates of the effect of institutions on long-run development. Section 6 turns to within-country, cross-regional variation, and shows that controlling for various

historical and geographic characteristics correlated with the path of development of different regions also reduces the estimated effect of human capital on long-run development to the more plausible range consistent with micro estimates. Section 7 concludes. Additional details on data construction and regression results omitted from the paper are contained in the Online Appendix, available at <http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/publication>.

## 2 Comments on the Previous Literature

As discussed in the Introduction, the most prominent previous contribution attempting to distinguish institutions and human capital as determinants of long-run development is Glaeser et al.'s (2004). After criticizing AJR (2001) for ignoring the role of human capital, Glaeser et al. pursue several strategies to show that human capital is the real driver of differences in long-run economic performance. Here we briefly summarize their contribution and the related contribution by Gennaioli et al. (2013), which makes the same argument using cross-regional level data.

First, Glaeser et al. estimated cross-sectional OLS regressions with the growth rate of income per capita between 1960 and 2000 as the dependent variable. In these models (e.g., their Table 4), they controlled both for human capital, measured by the logarithm of average years of schooling and various measures of institutions. They found both institutions and human capital to be significant and positively correlated with growth. Unsurprisingly, in view of our explanation above for why human capital thus included would be a “bad control,” and the fact that these regressions include many endogenous variables (such as the initial level of GDP per capita in 1960 in addition to measures of institutions), we believe that the estimated coefficients tell us little about the causal effect of either human capital or institutions.

Glaeser et al.'s second strategy was to estimate a series of models to show that initial levels of human capital are a better predictor of economic growth over various 10 year periods between 1960 and 2000 than initial political institutions measured by constraints on the executive. Though the notion that increased constraints on the executive should be correlated with improvements in economic institutions is important (e.g., North and Thomas, 1973, North and Weingast, 1989, AJR 2005), the basis of the AJR approach was to connect the exogenous component of (economic) institutions to incentives and opportunities underpinning economic development. These regressions speak little to this issue even if we set aside the usual omitted variables biases. In addition, they are particularly likely to be plagued by differential measurement error. In particular, constraints on the executive at the beginning of a 10 year period are

likely to be a highly imperfect measure of the true economic and political institutions of a nation (a point stressed by AJR, 2001, in arguing how OLS regressions are likely to underestimate the true effect of institutions on long-run development because of measurement error). Moreover, as noted above, to the extent that measurement error is less severe in human capital, OLS regressions will tend to find human capital to be significant and institutions not.

Glaeser et al.’s third strategy was to estimate instrumental variables models similar to AJR (though again focusing on constraints on the executive rather than AJR’s measures of economic institutions, protection against expropriation). They then instrumented human capital and constraints on the executive by a dummy variable for French legal origin in conjunction with either settler mortality or population density in 1500 (see their Table 11). But the identification strategy implicit in this approach was not clearly discussed.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, it is not clear why French legal origin should be an attractive instrument for human capital or the type of institutions that AJR focused on.<sup>9</sup> Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that French legal origin, conditional on settler mortality or population density in 1500, has no or little explanatory power for protection against expropriation or constraints on the executive, but has a large effect on contracting institutions, such as efficiency of courts or legal formalism (which is in turn essentially orthogonal to settler mortality and population density). So it is far from obvious that the combination of settler mortality and French legal origin can be plausibly exogenous source of variation in human capital and institutions.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, Glaeser et al. (2004) report panel regressions of changes in various measures of political institutions, for example constraints on the executive, over 5 year periods, on the levels of income per capita, years of schooling and the level of constraints on the executive and country fixed effects—but without time effects, which implies that part of the identification comes from time-series correlation of world averages of these measures. They present similar regressions where the dependent variable is the change in years of schooling over the same 5 year period. The results here are that, while years of schooling are correlated with changes in political

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<sup>8</sup>It is particularly unfortunate that there is no clear justification for some of the instruments to create plausible variations in one endogenous variable vs. the other, since both endogenous variables in this case, institutions and human capital, are correlated, and thus various misspecifications become more likely (see the discussion in Acemoglu, 2004).

<sup>9</sup>In fact, one might even question whether French legal origin is plausibly exogenous in this context. For example, according to the database of legal origins used by the authors all of Latin America is coded as having French Legal origin. But this is not because of “colonial transplantation of legal traditions,” but because of endogenous choices by these countries after independence. For example, though Mexico was invaded by the French during the short-lived rule of Emperor Maximilian between 1864 and 1867, the Mexican Civil Code of 1870, partially inspired by the Code Napoleon, was adopted not by the French but by the subsequent Benito Juárez regime.

<sup>10</sup>The first stages of their regression show that it is settler mortality that has the most effect on both human capital and institutions.

institutions (significantly in three quarters of the specifications), political institutions are not correlated with changes in schooling. Regressing the change on the level with country fixed effects—and without time fixed effects—is a rather unusual specification. In related empirical work Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2005, 2008, 2009) use a standard panel data model (regressing levels on levels with time and country fixed effects) and find no evidence of a causal effect of income or measures of educational attainment on democracy. Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2014), in turn, show that there is a robust and sizable impact of democracy on income per capita.<sup>11</sup>

Gennaioli, et al. (2013) report OLS regressions where all of the explanatory variables including measures of human capital and institutions are treated as exogenous. As explained above, this strategy is unlikely to be informative about the causal effects on economic development of human capital and institutions (and we return to this issue further below). Their only remedy for omitted variable biases is to include country fixed effects. They note that “By using country fixed effects, we avoid identification problems caused by unobservable country-specific factors” (p. 107). This appears, at least to us, to be insufficient since, as discussed in detail in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), institutions, as much as human capital, vary across regions within countries—think of US South vs. US North, or the North vs. the South of Italy, or Brazil, or India.<sup>12</sup> Though Gennaioli et al. (2013), on the other hand, find no evidence that institutional variation explains within-country variation in income per capita, this probably reflects their measures of institutions, which are particularly likely to be ridden with measurement error, and their reliance on OLS regressions, which is likely to attenuate the impact of institutions in the presence of differential measurement error as explained above.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>A recent paper by Easterly and Levine (2013) presents OLS regressions where the proportion of the population of European descent in former colonies in the colonial period is positively correlated with income per capita in 2005. When they include measures of human capital or institutions along with European settlement, the former two are significant while the latter is not, suggesting that both may be channels via which European settlement is working. But the measures of the proportion of the population of European descent are averages taken centuries after colonization (for example 1700-1750 for Jamaica or 1551-1807 for El Salvador) and are outcomes of the incentives and opportunities to colonize which depended on institutions amongst other things potentially influencing GDP today. In addition, their OLS regressions suffer from the same endogeneity and differential measurement error concerns discussed above.

<sup>12</sup>In fact, a recent burgeoning literature documents and exploits the sizable institutional variation within countries. Some prominent examples include Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Iyer (2010) on India, Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubín and Robinson (2008), Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2012, 2013) for Colombia, Dell (2010) for Peru, Naritomi, Soares and Assunção (2012) for Brazil, Bruhn and Gallego (2012) for the Americas, and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) for Africa. Importantly, all of these papers find strong evidence of the effect of institutions on long-run economic development at the within-country level.

<sup>13</sup>Their main measures of institutions are from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey and focus narrowly on a number of regulations affecting firm profitability collected from the urban and formal sector (e.g., number of days spent meeting with tax authorities in the past year or whether access to finance or land is a severe obstacle to business). Besides the measurement error issue, it is not even clear how to interpret these variables and what aspect of institutions they represent. Most poor countries have too little taxation and too small a government

### 3 Colonization and Human Capital

One of the critiques raised against the interpretation of the European colonial experience in terms of institutions is that different patterns of European settlement did not just create institutional variation but also direct variation in human capital. As mentioned above, Glaeser et al. (2004, p. 289), in particular, argue that the different development paths of, say, North America and South America were not created by institutional differences but by differences in initial human capital endowments of early colonists. They state that “it is far from clear that what the Europeans brought with them when they settled is limited government. It seems at least as plausible that what they brought with them is themselves, and therefore their know-how and human capital.”

It is plausible, but it turns out not to be correct.

The historical evidence suggests that the exact opposite of this claim seems to be true: the conquistadors who colonized South America were more educated than the British and other Europeans who colonized North America. Lockhart (1972, p. 35 Table 8) provided a detailed analysis of those who accompanied Pizarro on his conquest of Peru. Conquistadors typically signed a contract at the start of their expedition and the existing contracts allowed Lockhart to calculate that 76.6% could sign their name (this is the basic test used by historians for literacy in the pre-modern world). Other information, such as diaries, letters and books, suggests that 51% of the conquistadors could read and write. Similar exercises have been undertaken by Avelaneda (1995, p. 74 Table 4.1) for the conquistadors in 5 different expeditions to New Grenada (Colombia). He calculated that average literacy was 78.7%. Other evidence is consistent with very high rates of literacy among Spanish conquistadors. Literacy in Spain was lower, around 50%. But (a) conquistadors mostly came from urban areas, Castille and Andalucia, which had higher literacy, (b) many were hidalgos, second and third sons of nobles who could not inherit land under Spanish law.

So the Spanish conquistadors were a selected sample of the relatively highly educated. What about the Europeans who came to North America? Literacy was of course trending up over this period in Europe, and as Clark (2005) points out, it increased rapidly in 17th-century England. This would certainly lead one to anticipate that English colonists, such as those who sailed to Plymouth aboard the Mayflower in 1620, who were arriving later than their Spanish counterparts and were religious nonconformists placing heavy emphasis on literacy, should have

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(e.g., Acemoglu, 2005), so meeting with tax authorities might be good, not bad. No doubt financial markets are less developed in poor regions but this could be for a plethora of reasons unrelated to institutional differences. These problems probably explain why, as Gennaioli et al. (2013, p. 128) report, “on average, the quality of institutions is lower in the richest region than in the poorest one”. This too contrasts sharply with the pattern that the literature on within-country institutional variation finds in many different countries.

had far higher human capital than Spanish conquistadors. Even if they did, however, such migrants were not at all representative of the early settlers of British North America, most of whom were indentured laborers (Greene, 1988, Galenson, 1996). On balance it turns out that the first settlers of British North America were a bit more literate than the British population on average, but this still made them less literate than the Spanish settlers of South America. For example, Galenson's (1981) study of indentured laborers finds that in 1683-84, 41.2% of a sample of 631 indentured laborers able to sign their name on their contract of indenture (Table 5.2, p. 71). Since 80% of European population in 17th-century Virginia came as indentured laborers, the average literacy rate was certainly less than that of the Spanish conquistadors even if the remaining 20% had all been literate (something rather unlikely given that male literacy in England was around 60% in the late 17th century according to Clark, 2005).

Grubb (1990) pulls together a large number of studies of literacy in colonial America. Jury lists provide one rich source of information about literacy and suggest a figure of 54% for Virginia in the 1600s. Other sources suggest a slightly higher number, perhaps 60% in the 1600s. What about New England? The evidence that Grubb presents shows that for the period between 1650-1700 literacy was around 55% for rural areas of New England, not much different from Virginia, and 77% for Boston. While this number is as high as those for the Spanish conquistadors, it is for a much later period and it is not representative. The high number for Boston also reflects higher rates of urban literacy everywhere in the colony.<sup>14</sup>

By the 19th century, literacy and educational attainment was much higher in North America than in Latin America (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011). But this has nothing to do with whether Europeans brought much or little human capital with them when they first settled, and everything to do with institutions that later developed in different colonies. Some colonies made the decision to invest in education and build schools, which was in turn an outcome of their different economic and political institutions, while others invested in holding back the large majority of the population rather than investing in their human capital.

Thus the historical evidence does not support the claim that what distinguishes colonies like the United States, which developed inclusive institutions, from those such as much of Latin America, which developed extractive institutions, is that the early European settlers brought higher levels of human capital endowments to the former than to the latter group.

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<sup>14</sup>For example, in 1675-98 literacy in New York was 74.8%. For Philadelphia data from wills for the period 1699-1706 suggest a literacy rate of 80.0%.

## 4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

We use two datasets and several historical variables. In our cross-country analyses we use a dataset including 62 former colonies. In our within-country analyses we use a dataset including information for 670 sub-national regions (coming from 48 different former colonies). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for both samples, and in this section we provide definitions and sources for our main variables and also explain the potential exogenous sources of variation in human capital today we use.

### 4.1 Cross-Country Data

Our main dependent variable is the log of GDP per capita (PPP basis) in 2005 from the Penn World Tables. Our main indicator of current educational attainment for the cross-country analysis is average years of schooling of the population above 15 years of age in 2005 (from Barro and Lee, 2013a,b and Cohen and Soto, 2007).<sup>15</sup> The average country included in our sample has a population with about 6 years of schooling (roughly corresponding to the educational level of Algeria).

Our main measure of institutions is the rule of law index for 2005 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators constructed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2013).<sup>16</sup> We use this index because it provides the most up-to-date measure of broad institutions, close to the date in which our dependent variable is measured (2005). This indicator by construction can go from  $-2.5$  to  $2.5$ . The descriptive statistics presented in Panel A of Table 1 imply that our sample has somewhat lower levels of rule of law than the world, with an average of  $-0.33$  and a median of  $-0.56$ .

In terms of instrumental variables for institutions in our cross-country analyses, we use the log of potential settler mortality (capped at a maximum level of 250, as in AJR, 2012) and the log population density in 1500 (from AJR, 2002). We already explained the motivation for these variables in the Introduction.

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<sup>15</sup>The countries for which we use schooling data from Cohen and Soto (2007) are Angola, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Nigeria.

<sup>16</sup>The rule of law index “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2013).

## 4.2 Sources of Variation in Human Capital

Our main source of potentially exogenous variation in human capital is protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century.<sup>17</sup> In the cross-country analysis we use the share of protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in the 1920s from the path-breaking work of Woodberry (2004, 2012). We complement the information provided by Woodberry’s work with information from the World Atlas for Christian Missions (Dennis et al., 1911) for five countries with missing information in Woodberry (2004, 2012): Australia, Canada, Malta, New Zealand, and the United States.<sup>18</sup> In all our empirical analysis we add a dummy indicating that we use a different source of information for these five countries.

Christian missionaries play an important role in the development of the educational systems in former colonies, perhaps because “[they] wanted people to read the Scriptures in their own language” (Woodberry, 2004, p. 27; see also Gallego and Woodberry, 2010, Nunn, 2010, 2013, Woodberry, 2012, Frankema, 2012).

Arguing that protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century is excludable from regressions of long-run economic development is more challenging. First, missionaries clearly chose where to locate.<sup>19</sup> Second, missionary activity differed between British and French colonies, and also across different continents. Third, as also argued by Woodberry, missionary activity may have influenced the path of institutional development, including the emergence of democracy, as well as the schooling system and early human capital.<sup>20</sup> Fourth, missionary activity may have also impacted long-run development by influencing the current religious composition of the population. Nevertheless, conditional on continent dummies, the identity of the colonial power and crucially, institutions, the allocation of missionaries across and within countries may have been largely determined by idiosyncratic factors, and may be a candidate for an instrument for human capital (and in robustness checks, we also control for the direct effect of religion). In what follows, though we will first report models that do not control for continent dummies, identity of colonial power and institutions, our main models do condition on these variables (and we will in fact see that there is some evidence of upward bias when these variables are not conditioned

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<sup>17</sup>This source of cross-country variation has been used previously in Woodberry (2004, 2012) and Gallego and Woodberry (2009).

<sup>18</sup>In particular we use the share of the number of ordained foreign missionaries per 10,000 people to be consistent with Woodberry’s definition.

<sup>19</sup>This concern is the reason why we do not use catholic missionaries as a source of potentially exogenous variation in schooling. This variable is correlated with schooling outcomes, as documented by Gallego and Woodberry (2009). However, in a number of falsification exercises, we also found that the allocation of catholic missionaries in the early 20th century was correlated to schooling outcomes in 1900.

<sup>20</sup>Relatedly, Nunn (2013) argues that protestant missionaries may have had a positive impact on development through their effects on beliefs (in particular about gender roles).

on).<sup>21</sup> We will also provide support for this source of variation using a falsification exercise.

The average country in our cross-country sample had 0.46 protestant missionaries per 10,000 people (Table 1 Panel A). This is equivalent to the presence of missionaries in the Dominican Republic and Honduras. However, there is a significant degree of variation across countries: while the median country (Nigeria and India) had 0.26 protestant missionaries per 10,000 people, the country located at the 5th percentile of the distribution (Vietnam) had only 0.01 missionaries, and the country located at the 95th percentile (Jamaica) had 1.81 missionaries per 10,000 people. This variation is related to several determinants of missionary activity mentioned above (see also Woodberry, 2012; Gallego and Woodberry, 2009 and 2010).

Another source of variation in human capital today we utilize is primary enrollment rates in 1900 (relative to the population aged between 6 and 14). The data come from Benavot and Riddle (1988) and have been used previously by Gallego (2010). Panel A of Table 1 presents the huge variation in this variable in our sample.<sup>22</sup> This variation reflects certain institutional and idiosyncratic differences across colonies. Gallego (2010), for instance, documents that countries which were administered in a more decentralized fashion have higher enrollment rates. Nevertheless, there is also considerable idiosyncratic variation in this variable, related, for example, to policy priorities of their leaders.<sup>23</sup> This variable also captures variation in human capital that was developed at the beginning of the 20th century, which is a period before the big expansion of protestant missionaries. Once again conditional on our usual controls, and in particular conditional on institutions, this variable provides another plausible source of variation in human capital.<sup>24</sup> Differences in 19th-century enrollment rates also appear to have persisted to the present (for example, as shown by our first stages below). This type of persistence in

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<sup>21</sup>For example, Colombia has 0.05 protestant missionaries per 10,000 compared to Paraguay's 0.65. This seems largely related to the hegemony of the Conservative political forces in Colombia from the late 1880s until the 1930s. The shift of power to Liberals thereafter led to a surge in protestant missionary activity in the country. In Chile and Paraguay, in contrast, various innovative (and idiosyncratic) strategies by missionaries may have been important in leading to a high rates of protestant missionary activity (see, for example, Inman 1922). In sub-Saharan Africa, Congo Brazaville has very high presence of protestant missionaries in the early 20th century, in part because of the efforts for "the Protestant dream of a 'chain' across Africa, along the River Congo" (Sundkler and Steed, 2000).

<sup>22</sup>We imputed an enrollment of 0.6% for countries with missing information. This corresponds to the enrollment rate in 1880 in Cameroon. Our results are robust to using different values for this imputed level.

<sup>23</sup>For instance, the significant difference in enrollment levels between Argentina (33.9%) and Chile (21.7%) is in large part due to the policy priorities of Argentine president Domingo Sarmiento between 1868 and 1874, who aggressively promoted education in order to modernize Argentina. One can find similar examples in other continents. For instance the differences between India (4% enrollment in 1900) and Sri Lanka (22%) seem to be related to reforms which gave to local authorities in Sri Lanka more power to determine educational policy (Gallego, 2010).

<sup>24</sup>If anything, this variable might be correlated with other positive influences on GDP per capita today, and in that case, it will cause an upward bias in our estimates of the effect of human capital and a downward bias in the effect of institutions (with an argument similar to that in the Appendix of AJR, 2001).

human capital is quite common and has various causes. Gallego (2010) provides evidence on the persistence of differences in schooling and discuss its potential causes.

### 4.3 Regional Data

We use the income per capita variable in 2005 constructed by Gennaioli et al. (2013), in most cases corresponding to GDP per capita (PPP basis).<sup>25</sup> Our main indicator of current educational attainment is again average years of schooling of the population above 15 years of age in 2005 from Gennaioli et al. (2013). The average region has about 5.7 years of schooling (similar to the schooling levels in the Veraguas region in Panama).

We again utilize historical variation in protestant missionaries as an exogenous source of variation in average years of schooling today, but our key variable is the location of mission stations rather than total number of missionaries normalized by population. Specifically, we code a dummy variable for whether there is a protestant mission station in each region using the maps of protestant mission stations in 1916 available online from [www.prec.com](http://www.prec.com).<sup>26</sup>

Many forces determined the location of mission stations within countries. First, as Nunn (2013) discusses for the case of Africa, geography and climate played a significant role. Second, there is path dependence in terms of previous missionary work (Nunn, 2013). Third, variation was created because missionaries followed different strategies when faced with competing religious denominations (as noted by Gallego and Woodberry, 2010). In particular, in some places, partly responding to the regulations imposed by different colonial powers, missionaries from one denomination entered into direct competition with missionaries from a different denomination and co-located with them. In others, there was spatial differentiation leading them to locate their mission very close to that of the other group (see Gallego and Woodberry, 2010). Fourth, missionaries were mainly interested in conversions and therefore may have wished to go, when possible, to places with a large native population. However, as Nunn (2013) discusses for the case of Africa, some protestant missionaries sought to reach more marginalized people in peripheral areas. Therefore, the relationship between the location of protestant missionary stations and population density is ambiguous. Motivated by this, we present a robustness exercise in which

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<sup>25</sup>For the cases in which GDP at the regional level is not available, Gennaioli et al. (2013) use expenditure, wages, gross value added, or aggregate expenditure to estimate income per capita. In our sample of regions, the nine countries (accounting for 69 of our 670 regions) for which income data is constructed with information different from GDP are: Cameroon, Gabon, Malawi and Nicaragua (using expenditure data); Ghana and Nigeria (using income); Morocco (using GDP and expenditure); and Vietnam (using wages).

<sup>26</sup>These maps are similar to those presented in Roome (1924) and reported in Nunn (2013) for the case of African regions.

A similar variable has been used as a determinant of schooling at the regional level in Africa in Gallego and Woodberry (2010) and Nunn (2013).

we control for a proxy for population density before colonization.

We also control for a number of proxies for transportation costs (dummies for whether the region was landlocked and proxies of distance to the sea) and also add controls for climate conditions and a dummy for the capital of the country around 1920 being located in a particular region. This is closely related to the approach followed by Nunn (2013) for the case of Africa.

As in the case of our cross-country analysis, there are obvious challenges to the use of the mission station dummy as an instrument for average years of schooling at the regional level. Though the existing literature makes the link to schooling credible, there are the usual challenges to the exclusion restriction. First, despite the above arguments, there may still have existed a residual tendency for mission stations to be placed in areas that were more prosperous or that had greater development potential. Second, protestant missionaries may have impacted development today through other mechanisms than schooling. Our main response to these concerns is that to the extent that these potential omitted variable biases are important, they will lead to an upward bias in the returns to human capital, and if so, our results showing more limited returns to human capital becomes even more telling.

Panel B of Table 1 presents evidence that 54% of the 670 regions included in our analyses had missionary activity around 1916. It is interesting to notice that there is significant within-country variation in our dummy for the presence of missionaries.<sup>27</sup>

We do not have reliable within-country measures of institutions. In our cross-regional analysis, we therefore focus on estimating the returns to human capital using variation in the presence of protestant missionaries as a potentially-exogenous source of variation. In a robustness check, we use a proxy for (the log of) population density before colonization which might have influenced the regional path of institutional development.<sup>28</sup>

## 5 Cross-Country Evidence

In this section, we start with cross-country evidence, turning to cross-regional evidence in the next section. We first show the correlation between human capital and institutions on the one hand and GDP per capita today on the other. The correlations between these two variables and current prosperity likely reflect various omitted variable biases, however—even when we instrument for human capital differences (without controlling for the effect of institutions). We

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<sup>27</sup>Three countries have no protestant missionaries at all (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger) and 10 countries have missionaries present in all of their regions (Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia).

<sup>28</sup>This variable is constructed using information from Bruhn and Gallego (2012), Goldewijk, Beusen and Janssen (2010), and from country-specific sources, which are described in our Online Appendix.

then present “semi-structural” models in which we instrument for one of institutions and human capital and control for various historical determinants of the other to reduce the extent of the omitted variable bias. These models significantly reduce the impact of human capital on current prosperity and show broadly similar effects of institutions on GDP per capita. Finally, we present 2SLS and LIML (limited information maximum likelihood) models in which both institutions and human capital are simultaneously treated as endogenous. These models also show a robust effect of institutions and a much more limited (and quantitatively plausible) effect of human capital on GDP per capita.

## 5.1 OLS Regressions

In Table 2, we start with OLS regressions showing the correlation between prosperity today (measured by GDP per capita in 2005) and measures of human capital and institutions. As noted above, our sample consists of 62 former colonies for which we have data on the historical variables such as potential mortality rates of European settlers, population density in 1500, and protestant missionary activity at the turn of the 20th century. As with all of our other regressions, we report in this table standard errors that are robust against arbitrary heteroscedasticity.

Column 1 shows the bivariate relationship between average years of schooling and log GDP per capita in 2005. There is a significant relationship with a coefficient of 0.352 (s.e.= 0.027). The coefficient estimate is very large. As noted in the Introduction, an elastic supply of capital, no externalities and no omitted variable bias, the coefficient on years of schooling should match the coefficient estimated in micro-data regressions of (log) individual wages on individual years of schooling (see Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 3). These coefficients are typically estimated to be between 0.06 and 0.10 (corresponding to returns to schooling of 6-10%; see, e.g., Card, 1999). Because the coefficient of 0.352 is quite precisely estimated in this column, a 95% confidence interval easily excludes returns in the neighborhood of 0.06 or 0.10. This result thus suggests that there are either very large human capital externalities, which is not supported by existing estimates (e.g., Rauch, 1993, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Duflo, 2004) or a severe omitted variable bias. The rest of the evidence we present in this paper will support the omitted variable bias interpretation.

Column 2 turns to the bilateral correlation between the rule of law index and log GDP per capita. There is a very strong correlation between these two variables as well, with a coefficient of 0.930 (s.e.= 0.096). Column 3 includes both average years of schooling and the rule of law index in the regression. Both of these variables continue to be statistically significant, but the coefficient on the rule of law index is considerably smaller, 0.315 (s.e.= 0.128), while there is

only a small decrease in the coefficient of the average years of schooling, which is now 0.287 (s.e.= 0.035) and thus remains very large relative to the micro estimates mentioned above.

The remaining columns of the table add various other controls to these models. The controls are latitude (absolute value of the distance of the country to the equator), dummies for the continents of Africa, America and Asia (the “other” category, including Australasia, is the omitted group), and dummies for British and French colony (other European colonies is the omitted group). As already explained in the previous section, all of these variables are potentially important controls. Most importantly for our context, British, French and other European colonies may have had both different institutional legacies and human capital policies, and they also have encouraged and allowed different types of missionary activities. These controls generally have little effect on the statistical significance of our estimates or their quantitative magnitudes. For example, including all the above-mentioned controls simultaneously in column 12 reduces the coefficient of average years of schooling to 0.248 (s.e.= 0.050) and increases the coefficient on the rule of law index slightly to 0.428 (s.e.= 0.168). Interestingly, none of these controls are individually significant at the 5% level in this column (more generally, latitude and British and French colony dummies are never significant and continent dummies are not significant when both human capital and institutional variables are included).

There are other potential problems in interpreting the results in Table 2. One comes, as discussed in the Introduction, from the likelihood of differential measurement error in human capital and institutions. To the extent that there is greater measurement error in our measure of institutions than in the measure of human capital, and particularly because human capital is in part determined by institutions and thus correlated with them, the effect of institutions will tend to be attenuated and load on to human capital. This will cause downward bias in the estimates of the effect of institutions and upward bias in the estimates of the effects of human capital. This is a further reason for trying to develop instruments for education and institutions since, provided that the measurement error is classical, instrumental-variable estimates would correct for this problem. Another factor which might cause an upward bias in the estimated coefficient on human capital in OLS regressions comes from reverse causality: higher income levels may, through various channels, cause higher schooling.

To sum up, in OLS regressions, both human capital and institutional variables appear to be strongly correlated with current prosperity. For usual reasons, however, these correlations cannot be read as causal, and in this case, there is a *prima facie* case that omitted variables are potentially important since the coefficient on average years of schooling tends to be about five times the magnitude that would be consistent with micro evidence.

## 5.2 Semi-Structural Models

In this subsection, we make our first attempt at reducing the potential omitted variable bias in the OLS regressions reported in Table 2. We start with “semi-structural” models in which one of institutions and human capital is treated as endogenous, while we directly control for historical determinants of (potential instruments for) the other. Evidently, these models are quite closely related to the full 2SLS models in which both institutions and human capital are treated as endogenous and instrumented with the same variables.<sup>29</sup> As we will see, our semi-structural models do a fairly good job of reducing the omitted variable bias and, perhaps not surprisingly, lead to broadly similar results to those in our full 2SLS models.

We start in Table 3 with a falsification exercise for the validity of protestant missionary activity in early 20th century as a source of excludable variation in human capital. Much of the missionary activity took place at the beginning of the 20th century and should not have had an impact on education in the 19th century. We test this idea in columns 1-4 of Table 3 using data for a sample of 24 countries for which missionary activity clearly started after 1870 (in this table we do not control for the dummy for the source of protestant missionary activity since they all have the same source, from Woodberry). This table shows that either in bivariate regressions with primary enrollment in 1870 (or the earliest date available for these countries) or when we control for the same variables as in Table 2, there is no significant correlation between protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century and the fraction of the population enrolled in primary school in 1870. The coefficient estimates do move around but are never close to being significant.

In the next four columns (5 through 8), we look at the relationship between the fraction of the population enrolled in primary school in 1940—that is, after several decades of protestant missionary work—and protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century for the same sample of 24 countries. Our results show a stronger correlation between these two variables (the coefficient of protestant missionary activity is between 2.5 and 6.3 times the estimates in columns 1 to 4). In column 8, where we control for latitude, colonizer identity, and continent dummies, the coefficient on protestant missionary variable is significant at the 10% level (with a p-value=0.08). These results therefore suggest show that between 1870 and 1940, a considerably stronger correlation between protestant missionary activity and human capital emerged.

Finally, in the last four columns (9 through 12), we look at the relationship between average

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<sup>29</sup>In other words, this strategy is a mixture of 2SLS models and a reduced-form estimation of such models. In this reduced-form estimation one would regress the left-hand side variable on all instruments (naturally leaving out the endogenous regressors). Here, we are including all of the instruments for one of the endogenous regressors, while directly instrumenting for the other.

years of schooling in 2005 (our usual measure of human capital today) and protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century for the same sample of 24 countries. These models are very similar to our cross-country first-stage regressions, except for the sample. Similar to our first-stage regressions, there is now a strong effect of protestant missionary activity on human capital. Overall, the results in Table 3 support our key assumptions that protestant missionaries in the early 20th century did not differentially select into areas with higher human capital but they did then impact human capital investments in the areas where they located.

In Table 4, we report models in which average years of schooling is treated as endogenous, while we control for our two key historical variables generating plausibly exogenous sources of variation in historical institutions, potential settler mortality (capped as in AJR, 2012) and log population density in 1500. Throughout, Panel B reports the first-stage relationship between average years of schooling today and our instruments for human capital, protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century, and primary school enrollments in 1900.

Column 1 is the most parsimonious specification and does not include any variables other than average years of education, except for a dummy for different sources of protestant missionary data, which, as explained in Section 4, ought to be included whenever we include protestant missionary activity in the first or the second stage. In particular, it *does not* include historical determinants of institutional development. Panel B shows that there is a strong first stage with both instrumental variables being statistically significant and an F-statistic for the excluded instruments of about 26.<sup>30</sup>

In the second stage, this model leads to a large effect of average years of schooling on log GDP per capita in 2005, with a coefficient similar to the OLS models in Table 2, 0.314 (s.e.= 0.054). Since some of the later models have weaker first stages, throughout we also report 95% (heteroscedasticity-adjusted) Anderson-Rubin, henceforth AR, confidence intervals which are robust against weak instrument problems and heteroscedasticity (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2008; Mikusheva and Poi, 2006). This interval also comfortably excludes a zero effect.

The next three columns add the same controls as in Table 2, latitude, continent dummies and dummies for French and British colonies, and has little impact on the first or the second stage.<sup>31</sup> For example, when all of these controls are included simultaneously in column 4, the coefficient estimate on the average years of schooling is 0.317 (s.e.= 0.116).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>The dummy for different sources of information for our missionaries data is not statistically significant

<sup>31</sup>The estimates for the effects of these control variables in Tables 4 through 8 are not reported in order to save space and can be found in our Online Appendix.

<sup>32</sup>The first stage is considerably weaker and as a result the 95% AR confidence interval now marginally includes zero. In spite of the low values of the F-statistic for the excluded instruments, the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests reported at the bottom suggest that we can reject the hypothesis that the model is under-identified (i.e.,

If the estimates in columns 1-4 did correspond to the causal effect of human capital on (log) GDP per capita, they would again be much larger than the micro estimates. However, even though these models do instrument for variation in human capital today, they do not control for the effect of institutions.

We control for institutions in column 5 without any covariates. The log of potential settler mortality is significant both in the first and the second stage, while log population density in 1500 is marginally significant in the second stage, but not in the first stage.<sup>33</sup> More importantly, the 2SLS coefficient estimate for the effect of average years of schooling on log GDP per capita today is considerably smaller than in columns 1-4, 0.177, and only marginally significant (and the 95% AR confidence interval now comfortably include 0).

As we include our usual controls, the quantitative magnitude of the second-stage coefficient estimate remains similar or becomes a little smaller, and is now far from being statistically significant. In addition, in all cases, the confidence intervals comfortably include returns in the neighborhood of the micro estimates of the effects of human capital on earnings, in the 0.06-0.10 range.<sup>34</sup>

Columns 9-12 of the table estimate the same models as in columns 5-8, but with LIML, which is median-unbiased for overidentified models when there are weak instruments (see, e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, Staiger and Stock, 1997, and Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The overall picture is very similar to those in columns 1-4, with results broadly consistent with the micro estimates.<sup>35</sup>

Overall, we conclude that our semi-structural estimation strategy—controlling for historical determinants of institutions directly and instrumenting for average years of schooling today with its historical determinants—significantly reduces the estimates of the effect of human capital on GDP per capita today and brings these estimates in line with the micro estimates.

Table 5 is the polar opposite of Table 4. It treats the rule of law index as endogenous while the excluded instruments are not correlated with the endogenous regressor).

The Kleibergen and Paap test is an LM test of the rank of a matrix (Baum et al., 2010): under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified, the matrix of reduced form coefficients on the  $L$  excluded instruments has rank= $K - 1$  where  $K$ =number of endogenous regressors. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom= $(L - K + 1)$ . A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., the model is identified.

<sup>33</sup>The first-stage relationship for human capital is again somewhat weak (F-statistic of 12.62) but the Kleibergen and Paap test suggests the model is not underidentified (p-value of 0.03).

<sup>34</sup>In all of these models, the overidentification tests do not reject the null hypothesis, providing some, but limited, support for the exclusion restrictions, while the Kleibergen and Paap test comfortably rejects the hypothesis that the model is underidentified.

<sup>35</sup>In fact, the LIML models lead to estimates and standard errors that are quite similar to those in the 2SLS models. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) discuss, this pattern suggests that even though the first-stage F-statistics are on the low side, the estimates are unlikely to be driven by weak instrument problems. Reassuringly, this pattern of very similar LIML and 2SLS results is common to all of the models.

simultaneously controlling for the historical determinants of human capital today—protestant missionary activity and primary school enrollments in 1900. Column 1 is again the most parsimonious specification and does not include any variable other than the rule of law index. The bottom panel once again shows the first-stage relationship, which always uses both (capped) log potential settler mortality and log population density in 1500 as instruments. The first-stage relationship for column 1 is strong, with an F-statistics of about 32 (though log population density in 1500 is significant only at 10%). The effect of rule of law on GDP per capita is estimated fairly precisely and is quite large (1.413, s.e.= 0.177).<sup>36</sup> The overidentification test again provides support for the validity of instruments.

Columns 2-4 add our standard controls, latitude, continent dummies and dummies for French and British colonies. As in Table 4, this weakens the first stage somewhat (though now log population density in 1500 is also significant in many specifications). But the second-stage relationship remains very similar quantitatively and in terms of its precision to that in column 1. In all cases, both standard confidence intervals and the AR confidence interval at 95% comfortably exclude a zero effect of this measure of institutions on GDP per capita today.

Columns 5-8 add the historical determinants of human capital today as additional controls which are the two variables we used as instruments for human capital in Table 4 (human capital, protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century and primary enrollment in 1900). We also include the dummy for the source of protestant missionary data.<sup>37</sup> In contrast to the pattern we saw in Table 4, where the inclusion of historical variables related to institutions significantly reduced the magnitude and statistical significance of the human capital variable, the inclusion of historical variables related to human capital differences across countries has little impact on the relationship between the rule of law index and GDP per capita today: the coefficient estimates for rule of law are very similar to those in columns 1-4 and always statistically different from zero when we use standard confidence intervals. Because the first stages are often weakened by the inclusion of this historical variables, the (heteroscedasticity-corrected) AR confidence intervals become wider and in some specifications take the form of an unbounded interval. Nevertheless, these intervals consistently and comfortably exclude zero, and thus indicate a significant impact of institutions on GDP per capita.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Quantitatively, this parameter estimate implies that moving from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of rule of law (approximately from Sierra Leone’s value of  $-0.92$  to Sri Lanka’s  $-0.08$ ) increases GDP per capita by 169 log points. This is roughly about 75% of the income gap between Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. This magnitude is similar to that obtained in AJR (2001).

<sup>37</sup>As previously mentioned, we report the estimates of this and other control variables in the online appendix to save space.

<sup>38</sup>AJR (2012) argue why the relevant statistical issue is again whether the confidence interval does or does not exclude zero.

In columns 9 through 12 we replicate the results from columns 4 through 8 using LIML models. The overall picture is again very similar to those in columns 5-8, with point estimates and standard errors slightly larger than in the corresponding 2SLS estimates.

We therefore conclude from the semi-structural models that the relationship between institutions and current prosperity is considerably more robust than that between human capital and current prosperity. Moreover, once we move towards controlling for institutions, the magnitude of the estimates of the impact of human capital on GDP per capita declines from the implausibly large magnitudes and approaches the magnitudes seen in micro estimates. This bolsters the case that models that do not appropriately control for the effect, and the determinants, of institutions tend to suffer from a serious omitted variable bias, inflating the effect of human capital variables.

### 5.3 Full Two-Stage Least Squares Models

We next estimate models in which both institutions and human capital are simultaneously treated as endogenous and instrumented using the same historical variables we have utilized so far. Our baseline full 2SLS results are reported in Table 6. Panel B of this table provides the first stages for the two endogenous variables. These first-stage relationships are quite similar to those we have seen in the context of Tables 4 and 5. It is reassuring that the first stages show a pattern in which the instruments are statistically significant only for the relevant variables (i.e., protestant missionaries and primary enrollment rates in 1900 for schooling, and potential settler mortality and population density in 1500 for institutions).

Column 1 includes only average years of schooling and the rule of law index (as well as the dummy for the source of protestant missionary data). The first stages for this regression are in columns 1 and 5 in Panel B. The coefficient on average years of schooling is 0.223 (s.e.= 0.073), thus smaller than that in column 1 of Table 4. The coefficient on the rule of law index is 1.126 (s.e.= 0.355), also a little smaller than that in the first column of Table 5. However, as covariates are added, the rule of law index remains robustly significant and around the same magnitude, while average years of schooling becomes insignificant and its quantitative magnitude declines substantially. For example, in column 3, which includes latitude and continent dummies, the rule of law index has a coefficient of 1.324 (s.e.= 0.390), while the coefficient on average years of schooling declines to 0.069 (s.e.= 0.129). When we also include British and French colony dummies, the coefficient estimate for average years of schooling increases to 0.186, but is even more imprecisely estimated (while the coefficient on the rule of law index declines slightly but remains precisely estimated and significant).

We also report LIML models in columns 5-8, which show very similar quantitative and qualitative results. For example, with all of the covariates, the coefficient estimate for the effect of average years of schooling on log GDP per capita today is 0.094 (s.e.= 0.244), thus again in the ballpark of the 0.06-0.10 range from micro estimates, while the estimate of the coefficient on the rule of law index is similar to before, 1.464 (s.e.= 0.730).<sup>39</sup>

Table 7 probes the robustness of the results in Table 6. In this table, we only report LIML models to save space. Our main robustness checks are: (1) we drop the four neo-Europes (the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) where the path of institutional development may have been different and the nature of missionary activity was certainly quite distinct; (2) we control for current prevalence of falciparum malaria, as an overly-conservative test for whether some of the effect of potential settler mortality may be working through current prevalence of malaria (why this is overly conservative is explained in detail in AJR, 2001, including their Appendix); (3) we control for a variety of variables measuring humidity and temperature; (4) we control for the fraction of the population with different religious affiliations in 1900, so that we can isolate the effect of protestant missionary activity from the direct effect of religion.<sup>40</sup>

In all cases, the results are very similar to those in Table 6. The coefficient on the rule of law index is always between 1.15 and 1.49 and always significantly different from zero, while the coefficient estimate on average years of schooling is never statistically different from zero. In many models, it hovers in the ballpark of the micro estimates. The only exception is in the case of the models in which we control for religious affiliation in 1900, where the estimates increase in magnitude but remain statistically indistinguishable from zero.

In summary, the results from the full 2SLS/LIML models, where both institutions and human capital are instrumented using historical sources of variation, show a fairly robust effect of institutions on current prosperity, and a much more limited effect of human capital. It would be wrong to read these results as implying that human capital does not have a robust effect on GDP per capita. Rather, the results suggest that the impact of human capital is imprecisely estimated, but if anything is in the ballpark of micro estimates.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>A potential concern with our full 2SLS models is that one of the instruments for institutions (log population density) and one of the instruments for human capital (primary enrollment rates in 1900) have somewhat weaker justifications than our other instruments, and may be invalid despite the evidence supporting their validity in the overidentification tests. To investigate this issue, in the Online Appendix, we estimate exactly-identified models using only (capped) potential settler mortality and protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century as excluded instruments. Such exactly-identified models may be approximately unbiased (or have less bias) in the presence of weak instruments (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The results from these models confirm our conclusions but are, unsurprisingly, less precisely estimated.

<sup>40</sup>It is more informative to use religious affiliations in 1900, since current religious affiliations are likely to be endogenous to protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century.

<sup>41</sup>And this is in turn economically very plausible in view of the small magnitude of the estimates of human

## 5.4 Does Human Capital Cause Institutions?

A final question in this context is whether differences in human capital cause current institutional differences. To investigate this issue, we put our measures of institutions today on the left-hand side of regressions identical to those reported in Table 4. The results are reported in Table 8. The first-stage regressions for this model are identical to Panel B from Table 4 and are omitted to save space.

The pattern we see in Table 8 is quite similar to the one in Table 4. In the models in columns 1-4, although the Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals do include zero, there is a fairly robust positive correlation between (the exogenous component of) the average years of schooling and the rule of law index. However, when, in columns 5-8, we introduce settler mortality and population density in 1500 as additional controls, the coefficient on average years of schooling becomes insignificant and half of the time even has the wrong sign. The results in the last four columns using LIML are very similar to columns 5-8. Reassuringly, in these models, the coefficient on settler mortality is negative and statistically significant in all columns, though the magnitude of the coefficient halves when we add all of the covariates.

These regressions therefore suggest that, although human capital and institutions are positively correlated as one would expect when institutions impact economic development via all of the key proximate determinants, there is no causal impact of human capital on institutions.

## 6 Cross-Regional Evidence

In this section, we provide evidence on the effects of human capital on long-run economic development using data from 670 regions from 48 countries.

### 6.1 OLS Regressions

Table 9 shows some basic OLS regressions in a similar spirit to Table 2 but without the institutional variables. The dependent variable is log of GDP per capita at the regional level and all specifications include country fixed effects. The first column is the simplest specification where average years of schooling is the only explanatory variable in addition to the country fixed effects. Here we use the entire sample of 1840 observations from Gennaioli et al. (2013) to verify that the baseline results we obtain for our 670 regions are similar to the results in the larger sample.<sup>42</sup>

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capital externalities we have discussed above.

<sup>42</sup>The reason for the difference between the two samples is simple: given the justification of our instrument, we cannot include Europe, where protestant missionary activity is not a plausible source of exogenous variation in

The estimated coefficient in column 1, 0.289 (s.e.=0.011), is highly significant and its magnitude is similar to those seen in Table 2. In column 2 we estimate the same specification on our sample of 670 regions. The results are almost identical, with a coefficient estimate of 0.280 (s.e.= 0.016).

Adding various covariates does not appreciably change the estimates. The next two columns include: a quadratic in the distance to the coast (potentially capturing the idea that more isolated regions may be poorer); a dummy for whether or not the administrative unit is landlocked; and two temperature variables. The estimate of the coefficient on average years of schooling is remarkably stable across the columns in this table. Finally, the last column includes a control for our proxy for population density before colonization. Results barely change and the population density variable is negative and significant as in Bruhn and Gallego (2012).

## 6.2 Two-Stage Least Squares Models

In Table 10 we use the presence of a protestant mission in the early 20th century, but now at the regional level, to instrument for average years of schooling. Panel B contains the first-stage regressions. All columns again include country fixed effects. In column 1 of Panel B we see a strong first-stage relationship (e.g., the F-statistic is 26.91). In the second stage, however, once we instrument for average years of schooling, its coefficient falls in magnitude towards the micro estimates and often becomes statistically insignificant. In column 1, for example, the coefficient is 0.192 (s.e.=0.065) considerably smaller than the non-instrumented coefficient in column 2 of Table 9, which was 0.28.

In column 2 we again include the dummy variable for whether or not the region contains the capital city and the coefficient on average years of schooling falls further and becomes insignificant (0.124, s.e.=0.093). Adding the rest of the covariates, including the log population density before colonization in the last column, does little to change this pattern.

We conclude from this evidence that, as in the cross-country regressions, once we instrument for differences in human capital today and include the controls that are necessary to make this instrumental-variables strategy valid, the magnitude of the effect of human capital on GDP per capita today falls from very high to plausible levels that are consistent with the micro evidence. One difference from the cross-country evidence is that in the models reported in this section, instrumenting for differences in human capital is sufficient to achieve this result, whereas in the cross-country models controlling for institutions was also necessary. This probably reflects the fact that protestant missionary activity is not a valid source of variation unless we control for

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human capital.

institutions at the country level, but conditional on country fixed effects, it provides a more plausible source of variation in within-country variation in human capital.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper we have revisited the relationship between institutions, human capital accumulation and long-run economic development. This has been the topic of an intense debate over the past decade. One view, proposed in AJR (2001) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and inspired by North and Thomas (1973), focuses on institutions as the fundamental determinant of development. According to this view the ‘Great Divergence’ in levels of prosperity which has occurred over the past 250 years is a consequence of societies having very different types of institutions. Most of the empirical literature on this topic is agnostic about the channels via which institutions impact long-run development, and it is plausible that they do via all of TFP and human and physical capital accumulation.

Another view, emanating from Lipset (1959), maintains that it is the process of ‘modernization’—comprising, *inter alia*, economic growth, educational expansion and structural change—that drives institutional change.

The evidence we have presented in this paper supports the first view.

We do find, as reported in Table 2, that in simple OLS regressions both human capital and institutional variables are statistically significant (as in Glaeser et al., 2004, Table 4, p. 281). Yet we do not consider these results to be very meaningful given both the “bad control” problem discussed in the Introduction and the serious endogeneity concerns. One of the main strategies we use in this paper to overcome this problem is to build on the work of Gallego (2010), Gallego and Woodberry (2009, 2010) and Woodberry (2012) and construct two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in human capital (the presence of protestant missionaries in the early 20th century and primary school enrollment rates in 1900). We show that the protestant missionary variable satisfies an important falsification exercise, suggesting that it is indeed uncorrelated with prior schooling but strongly correlated with subsequent investments in human capital, and both regressions satisfy overidentification tests.

We also build on AJR (2001, 2002, 2012) instrumenting for current institutions, in this paper the rule of law index, using historical sources of variation in the sample of former colonies—in particular, related to potential settler mortality and the density of the indigenous population before colonization.

The current paper is of course far from the final word on this topic. Future research will need

to focus on other, more credible sources of variation both between and within countries in order to understand how human capital contributes to economic and social development, and interacts with institutions (which it certainly does). The interactions are probably much more complex and interesting, for example, as suggested by the recent work of Friedman, Kremer, Miguel and Thornton (2011), who provide evidence from one randomized trial in Kenya strongly inconsistent with key aspects of modernization theory. Their results, instead, suggest that greater education can be a path to more discontent depending on the institutional and social context. There is also ample room for developing better measures of sub-national institutions and exploiting the rich sub-national variation in institutional development paths and development outcomes, building on and contributing to a burgeoning literature we have briefly discussed above.

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Table 1: Summary statistics

	Obs	Mean	S.D.
Panel A: Cross-country sample			
log GDP per capita	62	8.291	1.213
Years of schooling	62	6.179	2.878
Rule of law	62	-0.33	0.90
Primary enrollment in 1900	62	16.66	23.05
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century	62	0.458	0.547
log capped potential settler mortality	62	4.445	0.961
log population density in 1500	62	0.545	1.727
Dummy for different source of protestant missions	62	0.081	0.275
Latitude	62	0.181	0.134
British colony	62	0.387	0.491
French colony	62	0.242	0.432
Africa	62	0.419	0.497
Asia	62	0.145	0.355
America	62	0.387	0.491
Panel B: Cross-region sample			
log GDP per capita	670	8.808	1.248
Years of schooling	670	7.103	3.089
Temperature	670	15.924	8.286
Inverse distance to coast	670	0.851	0.147
Landlocked region	670	0.506	0.500
Protestant missionaries presence in early 20th century	670	0.538	0.499
Capital city	670	0.0732	0.261
log population density before colonization	635	0.8405	2.3786

Notes: See Section 4 of the text for variable definitions and sources.

Table 2: OLS cross country regressions

Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Years of schooling	0.352 (0.027)		0.287 (0.035)	0.332 (0.033)		0.286 (0.034)	0.304 (0.048)		0.229 (0.049)	0.322 (0.049)		0.248 (0.050)
Rule of law		0.930 (0.096)	0.315 (0.128)		0.865 (0.128)	0.280 (0.161)		0.818 (0.149)	0.411 (0.169)		0.821 (0.154)	0.428 (0.168)
Latitude				1.072 (0.757)	0.801 (0.866)	0.46 (0.845)	1.11 (0.725)	0.067 (0.862)	0.288 (0.784)	1.132 (0.731)	0.053 (0.921)	0.301 (0.774)
Africa							-0.243 (0.350)	-0.726 (0.345)	0.005 (0.374)	-0.263 (0.348)	-0.736 (0.356)	0.000 (0.366)
America							0.015 (0.214)	0.437 (0.270)	0.456 (0.281)	-0.087 (0.256)	0.435 (0.288)	0.348 (0.314)
Asia							0.055 (0.428)	-0.263 (0.325)	0.192 (0.367)	0.095 (0.426)	-0.266 (0.332)	0.249 (0.367)
British colony										-0.216 (0.244)	-0.004 (0.257)	-0.269 (0.240)
French colony										0.042 (0.288)	0.021 (0.347)	0.024 (0.280)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
R-squared	0.699	0.47	0.729	0.711	0.476	0.731	0.718	0.655	0.75	0.724	0.655	0.758

Notes: OLS regressions with one observation per country. See Section 4 for variable definitions. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.

Table 3: Falsification exercise, protestant missionaries, cross-country sample

Dependent variable:	Primary enrollment in 1870				Years of schooling in 2005			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century	1.694 (4.124)	5.370 (4.180)	1.833 (2.608)	2.589 (3.446)	2.172 (1.298)	2.924 (1.312)	2.329 (0.754)	2.483 (0.791)
Latitude		31.174 (22.810)	26.926 (14.399)	38.032 (16.044)		6.371 (4.054)	5.589 (3.051)	5.576 (3.412)
Africa			0.649 (1.159)	-2.105 (2.188)			-2.262 (0.559)	-2.307 (0.831)
America			13.623 (2.860)	7.524 (3.894)			1.112 (0.631)	1.589 (1.115)
French colony				-6.481 (3.568)				0.596 (0.848)
British colony				-1.602 (3.077)				1.440 (0.937)
Observations	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
R-squared	0.004	0.107	0.562	0.611	0.063	0.089	0.776	0.795

Notes: OLS regressions with one observation per country. The sample includes former colonies where protestant missionary activity started after 1870. See Section 4 for variable definitions. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.

Table 4: Semi-structural regressions, years of schooling, cross-country sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Second-stage regressions												
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005												
Estimation method	2SLS								LIML			
Years of schooling	0.314 (0.054)	0.305 (0.054)	0.274 (0.101)	0.317 (0.116)	0.177 (0.106)	0.171 (0.106)	0.131 (0.128)	0.178 (0.134)	0.177 (0.106)	0.171 (0.106)	0.122 (0.135)	0.170 (0.144)
<i>A. R. confidence intervals</i>	[.17, .44]	[.16, .44]	[-.00, .48]	[-.01, .56]	[-.15, .41]	[-.16, .40]	[-.34, .43]	[ -∞, .55]	[-.16, .41]	[-.16, .40]	[-.35, .43]	[-.36, .54]
log capped potential settler mortality					-0.475 (0.181)	-0.450 (0.189)	-0.427 (0.209)	-0.449 (0.199)	-0.475 (0.181)	-0.450 (0.189)	-0.435 (0.217)	-0.454 (0.204)
log population density in 1500					-0.114 (0.062)	-0.121 (0.062)	-0.107 (0.060)	-0.085 (0.065)	-0.114 (0.062)	-0.121 (0.062)	-0.109 (0.061)	-0.087 (0.067)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
Over-identification test (p-value)	0.99	0.76	0.43	0.44	0.87	0.94	0.48	0.50	0.87	0.94	0.48	0.50
Panel B: First-stage regressions												
Dependent variable is years of schooling												
Primary enrollment in 1900	0.088 (0.016)	0.088 (0.016)	0.051 (0.017)	0.051 (0.018)	0.069 (0.016)	0.072 (0.017)	0.046 (0.018)	0.047 (0.021)	0.069 (0.016)	0.072 (0.017)	0.046 (0.018)	0.047 (0.021)
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century	0.938 (0.423)	0.958 (0.425)	1.173 (0.318)	1.168 (0.362)	0.657 (0.444)	0.577 (0.462)	0.935 (0.406)	0.938 (0.431)	0.657 (0.444)	0.577 (0.462)	0.935 (0.406)	0.938 (0.431)
log capped potential settler mortality					-1.042 (0.359)	-1.104 (0.403)	-0.602 (0.461)	-0.629 (0.502)	-1.042 (0.359)	-1.104 (0.403)	-0.602 (0.461)	-0.629 (0.502)
log population density in 1500					-0.131 (0.139)	-0.120 (0.145)	-0.067 (0.148)	-0.061 (0.180)	-0.131 (0.139)	-0.120 (0.145)	-0.067 (0.148)	-0.061 (0.180)
R-squared	0.599	0.599	0.718	0.718	0.677	0.68	0.734	0.734	0.677	0.68	0.734	0.734
F-stat excluded instruments	25.94	25.49	18.84	12.02	12.62	12.42	8.7	5.58	12.62	12.42	8.7	5.58
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
Control variables included in first and second stage												
Dummy for different source of protestant missions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continent dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Colonial origin dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Panel A presents second-stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900 and Panel B presents the corresponding first-stage regressions, with one observation per country. All variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity in parentheses. A.R. confidence intervals correspond to the 95% Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals robust against weak instruments and heteroscedasticity. The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the over-identification test correspond to a Hansen over-identification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions).

Table 5: Semi-structural regressions, rule of law, cross-country sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Second-stage regressions												
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005												
	2SLS								LIML			
Rule of law	1.413 (0.177)	1.634 (0.274)	1.346 (0.194)	1.361 (0.212)	1.705 (0.378)	1.791 (0.450)	1.519 (0.298)	1.424 (0.275)	1.714 (0.383)	1.794 (0.453)	1.592 (0.337)	1.579 (0.353)
<i>A. R. confidence intervals</i>	[1.15, 1.92]	[1.21, 2.66]	[.86, 1.86]	[.88, 1.84]	[1.06, ∞]	[1.06, ∞]	[.75, ∞]	[.67, ∞]	[1.06, ∞]	[1.06, ∞]	[0.75, ∞]	[.67, 2.57]
Primary enrollment in 1900					0.018 (0.009)	0.020 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.018 (0.009)	0.020 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century					0.059 (0.212)	-0.001 (0.222)	0.184 (0.170)	0.261 (0.180)	0.058 (0.213)	-0.002 (0.222)	0.170 (0.177)	0.233 (0.194)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value)	0.0	0.030	0.020	0.020	0.030	0.120	0.060	0.060	0.030	0.120	0.060	0.060
Over-identification test (p-value)	0.230	0.390	0.250	0.140	0.690	0.810	0.340	0.170	0.690	0.810	0.350	0.190
Panel B: First-stage regressions												
Dependent variable is rule of law												
log capped potential settler mortality	-0.597 (0.098)	-0.476 (0.111)	-0.292 (0.109)	-0.231 (0.109)	-0.402 (0.113)	-0.366 (0.122)	-0.235 (0.103)	-0.226 (0.107)	-0.402 (0.113)	-0.366 (0.122)	-0.235 (0.103)	-0.226 (0.107)
log population density in 1500	-0.081 (0.058)	-0.083 (0.054)	-0.152 (0.051)	-0.160 (0.050)	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.069 (0.057)	-0.111 (0.057)	-0.126 (0.060)	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.069 (0.057)	-0.111 (0.057)	-0.126 (0.060)
Primary enrollment in 1900					-0.002 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century					0.021 (0.171)	0.066 (0.173)	0.049 (0.165)	0.004 (0.176)	0.021 (0.171)	0.066 (0.173)	0.049 (0.165)	0.004 (0.176)
R-squared	0.508	0.551	0.638	0.656	0.603	0.612	0.664	0.669	0.603	0.612	0.664	0.669
F-stat excluded instruments	31.820	13.480	9.550	8.320	6.270	4.580	5.070	5.450	6.270	4.580	5.070	5.450
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
Control variables included in first and second stage												
Latitude	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continent dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Colonial origin dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Dummy for different source of protestant missions	No	No	No	No	Yes							

Notes: Panel A presents second-stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900 and Panel B presents the corresponding first-stage regressions, with one observation per country. All variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity in parentheses. A.R. confidence intervals correspond to the 95% Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals robust against weak instruments and heteroscedasticity. The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the over-identification test correspond to a Hansen over-identification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions).

Table 6: Full 2SLS and LIML estimates, cross-country sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Second-stage regressions								
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005								
	2SLS				LIML			
Years of schooling	0.223 (0.073)	0.224 (0.074)	0.069 (0.129)	0.186 (0.142)	0.217 (0.077)	0.218 (0.078)	-0.019 (0.194)	0.094 (0.244)
Rule of law	1.126 (0.355)	1.123 (0.378)	1.324 (0.390)	1.062 (0.374)	1.168 (0.387)	1.170 (0.415)	1.701 (0.674)	1.464 (0.730)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value)	0.10	0.260	0.110	0.070	0.10	0.260	0.110	0.070
Over-identification test (p-value)	0.620	0.60	0.20	0.120	0.630	0.620	0.340	0.220
Panel B: First-stage regressions								
	Years of schooling				Rule of law			
Primary enrollment in 1870	0.069 (0.016)	0.072 (0.017)	0.046 (0.018)	0.047 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century	0.657 (0.444)	0.577 (0.462)	0.935 (0.406)	0.938 (0.431)	0.021 (0.171)	0.066 (0.173)	0.049 (0.165)	0.004 (0.176)
log capped potential settler mortality	-1.042 (0.359)	-1.104 (0.403)	-0.602 (0.461)	-0.629 (0.502)	-0.402 (0.113)	-0.366 (0.122)	-0.235 (0.103)	-0.226 (0.107)
log population density in 1500	-0.131 (0.139)	-0.120 (0.145)	-0.067 (0.148)	-0.061 (0.180)	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.069 (0.057)	-0.111 (0.057)	-0.126 (0.060)
R-squared	0.677	0.68	0.734	0.734	0.603	0.612	0.664	0.669
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
F statistic for excluded instruments in relevant equation								
Institutions	6.44	6.37	1.22	1.25	6.27	4.58	5.07	5.45
Schooling	12.62	12.42	8.70	5.58	0.05	0.16	0.79	0.10
Control variables included in first and second stage								
Dummy for different source of protestant missions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continent dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Colonial origin dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Panel A presents second stage regressions with rule of law instrumented using the ln of potential settler mortality and the ln of population density in 1500 and years of schooling instrumented using Protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900 and Panel B presents the corresponding first stage regressions, with one observation per country. All variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors for the constants and the control variables are not reported to save space (an online appendix presents all the estimates). The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the over-identification test correspond to a Hansen overidentification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of overidentifying restrictions).

Table 7: Robustness exercises. Full LIML models, second-stage regressions, cross-country sample

Sample	Excluding Neo-Europes		All					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Years of education	0.034 (0.199)	0.174 (0.196)	-0.043 (0.191)	0.041 (0.198)	0.009 (0.136)	0.120 (0.196)	0.119 (0.186)	0.197 (0.187)
Rule of law	1.432 (0.679)	1.149 (0.595)	1.382 (0.591)	1.218 (0.501)	1.193 (0.386)	1.181 (0.389)	1.487 (0.687)	1.336 (0.662)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value)	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.01	0.05	0.14	0.13
Over-identification test (p-value)	0.33	0.24	0.52	0.57	0.85	0.81	0.66	0.47
Control variables included in first and second stage								
Dummy for different source of protestant missions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continent dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colonial origin dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Falciparum malaria index 1994	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Humidity variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Temperature dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Religion affiliation in 1900	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	58	58	61	61	62	62	62	62

Notes: Second-stage regressions with rule of law and years of education instrumented using the log capped potential settler mortality, log population density in 1500, protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900, with one observation per country. Columns 1 and 2 present regressions excluding the Neo-Europes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US). All the remaining columns present estimates for the complete sample. In columns 4 and 5 we add the following controls for humidity and temperature: average, minimum, and maximum monthly high temperatures, and minimum and maximum monthly low temperatures, and morning minimum and maximum humidity, and afternoon minimum and maximum humidity (from Parker, 1997). In columns 7 and 8 we add controls for the share of the catholic, Muslim, and protestant population in 1900 from the World Christian Encyclopedia. All variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity in parentheses. The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the over-identification test correspond to a Hansen over-identification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions).

Table 8: Effects of years of schooling on institutions, second-stage regression, cross-country sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dependent variable is rule of law												
	2SLS				LIML							
Years of schooling	0.081 (0.034)	0.073 (0.034)	0.173 (0.062)	0.163 (0.077)	-0.021 (0.072)	-0.028 (0.072)	0.086 (0.062)	0.039 (0.087)	-0.022 (0.072)	-0.031 (0.073)	0.086 (0.063)	0.038 (0.088)
<i>A. R. confidence intervals</i>	[-.01, .16]	[-.02, .15]	[-.05, .32]	[-.02, .34]	[-.27, .13]	[-.28, .12]	[-.09, .25]	[-∞, .23]	[-.27, .13]	[-.27, .12]	[-.09, .25]	[-∞, .23]
log capped potential settler mortality					-0.425 (0.163)	-0.406 (0.179)	-0.180 (0.093)	-0.197 (0.103)	-0.426 (0.163)	-0.409 (0.180)	-0.180 (0.093)	-0.198 (0.103)
log population density in 1500					-0.065 (0.061)	-0.072 (0.061)	-0.105 (0.049)	-0.124 (0.052)	-0.065 (0.061)	-0.073 (0.062)	-0.105 (0.049)	-0.124 (0.052)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.030	0.030	0.020	0.010	0.030	0.030	0.020	0.010
Over-identification test (p-value)	0.810	0.570	0.930	0.930	0.840	0.630	0.810	0.80	0.840	0.630	0.80	0.80
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
Control variables included in first and second stage												
Dummy for different source of Protestant missions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continent dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Colonial origin dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Second stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900. All variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity in parentheses. A.R. confidence intervals correspond to the 95% Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals robust to weak instruments and heterocedasticity. The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the over-identification test correspond to a Hansen over-identification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions).

Table 9: OLS regressions, cross-region sample

	Dependent variable is log GDP per capita					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(5)
Years of schooling	0.289 (0.011)	0.280 (0.016)	0.262 (0.018)	0.255 (0.019)	0.256 (0.019)	0.264 (0.021)
Capital city			0.157 (0.057)	0.160 (0.057)	0.162 (0.057)	0.148 (0.057)
Inverse distance to coast				-0.803 (1.219)	0.172 (1.351)	-0.060 (1.351)
Squared inverse distance to coast				0.528 (0.822)	-0.087 (0.898)	0.113 (0.900)
State has no sea coastline dummy				-0.062 (0.032)	-0.066 (0.034)	-0.047 (0.033)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius)					-0.032 (0.016)	-0.025 (0.015)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) squared					0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
log population density in 1500						-0.034 (0.008)
Observations	1840	670	670	670	670	635
R-squared	0.942	0.937	0.938	0.938	0.938	0.938

Notes: OLS regressions with one observation per region. See Section 4 for variable definitions. All regressions include a full set of country fixed effects. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.

Table 10: IV regressions, cross-region sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: IV regressions, cross region					
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita					
Years of schooling	0.192 (0.065)	0.124 (0.093)	0.116 (0.096)	0.118 (0.098)	0.147 (0.103)
Capital city		0.399 (0.169)	0.390 (0.165)	0.390 (0.167)	0.347 (0.181)
Inverse distance to coast			-3.803 (2.389)	-3.068 (2.648)	-2.651 (2.646)
Squared inverse distance to coast			2.646 (1.648)	2.179 (1.806)	1.924 (1.806)
State has no sea coastline dummy			-0.045 (0.036)	-0.051 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.038)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius)				-0.022 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.018)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) squared				0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
log population density in 1500					-0.030 (0.010)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value)	0	0	0	0	0
Panel B: First stages					
Dependent variable is years of schooling					
Protestant missionaries in early 20th century	0.480 (0.089)	0.342 (0.078)	0.334 (0.074)	0.330 (0.074)	0.303 (0.076)
Capital city		1.687 (0.149)	1.587 (0.147)	1.579 (0.147)	1.635 (0.152)
Inverse distance to coast			-21.283 (3.805)	-22.914 (4.285)	-21.767 (4.296)
Squared inverse distance to coast			15.091 (2.448)	16.106 (2.723)	15.312 (2.731)
State has no sea coastline dummy			0.134 (0.107)	0.133 (0.115)	0.131 (0.120)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius)				0.059 (0.043)	0.054 (0.043)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) squared				-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
log population density in 1500					0.028 (0.027)
R-squared	0.901	0.92	0.928	0.928	0.929
F-stat excluded instruments	26.91	17.88	18.71	18.47	14.82
Observations	670	670	670	670	635

Notes: Panel A presents second-stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using the presence of protestant missionaries in the region and Panel B presents the corresponding first stage regressions, with one observation per region. All variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity are in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country fixed effects. The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1).